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The Influence of the Government on Corporate Environmental Reporting 
in China: An Authoritarian Capitalism Perspective 
Abstract: 
This study uses panel data to investigate the different roles of the Chinese government in 
influencing companies’ decision making about corporate environmental reporting (CER) via a 
two-stage process. The results show that the Chinese government appears to mainly influence 
the decision whether to disclose or not, but has limited influence on how much firms disclose. 
The results also show that the traditional model of authoritarian capitalism (under which state-
owned enterprises [SOEs] are the major governance arrangement) is transforming into a new 
model. In the new model of authoritarian capitalism, the Chinese government uses newer, more 
sophisticated tools to manage both state-owned and non–state-owned companies. In addition, 
these new governance arrangements appear to be more efficient than the traditional model. The 
findings of this study have implications for both the Chinese government and for Chinese 
companies, as well as making important contributions to the literature and knowledge of CER 
in China. 
Keywords: 
Authoritarian capitalism, Chinese government, corporate environmental reporting, institutional 
theory, panel data 
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The Influence of the Government on Corporate Environmental Reporting 
in China: An Authoritarian Capitalism Perspective 
In recent years, Chinese firms have increasingly been practicing environ- mental reporting 
indicating a potential change in their consideration of being environmentally responsible 
(Dong, Burritt, & Qian, 2014; Gao, 2011; Tilt, 2016). However, the influences on this 
increasing trend are not clear. Previous studies in developed countries have found that drivers 
of corporate environmental reporting (CER) are diverse and are in many ways competitive in 
terms of the resources they demand from companies. Although it has moved toward a more 
capitalist orientation, the Chinese institutional setting is still largely characterized by 
authoritarian capitalism, in which the Chinese central government, local governments, and the 
Chinese Communist Party do not merely play the role of regulators but act in other significant 
ways in the Chinese business system (N. Lin, 2011). Recently, the government has been 
instrumental in encouraging environmental reforms, as the scale of environmental degradation 
that has come with the rapid economic growth of the country is significant. As such, the 
Chinese government is an important driver in motivating CER, but the nuances of its influence 
have not been studied in detail. 
Although recently more scholars have begun to consider government influence on CER, 
they generally either point out that the Chinese government has had a positive effect on CER 
(Xun, 2013), or only focus on its control over state-owned enterprises (SOEs; Dong et al., 2014; 
Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). Given that the Chinese government has a complex role in the 
country’s politics and economics, it may not be appropriate to consider solely its influence 
through this kind of shareholding. Therefore, this study attempts to narrow this gap by 
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exploring the different roles of the Chinese government in influencing CER. Specifically, this 
article has three related aims: 
1. to determine whether there is any association between the Chinese government 
and the decision to provide CER, 
2. to examine what are the specific roles the Chinese government plays in 
influencing CER, and 
3. to examine the efficiency of the roles the Chinese government plays in 
influencing CER. 
The article makes the following three important contributions. First, it unpacks the 
decision-making processes for listed Chinese firms in terms of CER, an important aspect of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), by investigating the influence of the state on companies’ 
decision making about CER via a two-stage process. Most prior studies of CER consider only 
volume, but in this study, the initial decision about whether firms choose to disclose any 
environmental information or not is considered first. Then, for those companies that do choose 
to disclose environmental information, the extent of that reporting is investigated. Second, it 
adds to the limited number of studies that apply institutional theory in government-dominated 
transitional emerging economies, in this case, the authoritarian capitalistic context of China. 
Specifically, it answers the call for further research to be conducted on how the Chinese 
government deploys CSR for governance purposes. We find that unlike Matten and Moon’s 
(2008) prediction that in government-dominated transitional economies where business’ roles 
and responsibilities are delineated by regulation (Miller, 2005), the evidence from CER in 
China paradoxically shows that greater emphasis is given to explicit CSR. Although this is 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
ostensibly similar to what Matten and Moon (2008) observed among European states in the 
early 2000s, the nature of the explicit CSR in China is different, whereby the Chinese 
government uses newer, more sophisticated tools to compel Chinese firms to voluntarily 
engage in explicit CSR largely through coercive isomorphism. This leads to a related third 
contribution of this study, in that, unlike existing research that points to increasing government 
influence (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Xun, 2013) and normative pressures leading to more 
substantive reporting (Zuo, Schwartz, & Wu, 2017), we find that there are limits to these 
influences and pressures in the Chinese context, as firms are mainly engaging in CER due to 
the government’s incentivizing influence. The main mechanism for normative isomorphic 
pressures for explicit CSR is from international influences. 
Theoretical Framework and Study Context 
CSR, CER and the Role of Government 
A number of studies attempt to explore where the pressures for forcing any given level of 
information disclosure come from (Damak-Ayadi, 2010; Holcomb, Upchurch, & Okumus, 
2007; KPMG, 2008). However, most of these studies are based on contexts of more developed 
economies with free- market and democratic institutions, and where voluntarism is the 
generally accepted principle to frame and understand CSR activities (Dentchev, Haezendonck, 
& van Balen, 2017). As such, the role of government in encouraging CSR has been studied less 
and has not been discussed adequately “in theoretical and conceptual terms” (Gond, Kang, & 
Moon, 2011, p. 641).  
Scholars note, however, that the role of government in encouraging CSR is important 
(Aßländer & Curbach, 2017; Dentchev, Haezendonck, & van Balen, 2017; Fox, Ward, & 
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Howard, 2002; Steurer, 2010). Lepoutre, Dentchev, and Heene (2007) recommend that 
government should intervene to reduce the substantive, strategic, and institutional uncertainties 
associated with CSR. Aßländer and Curbach (2017) believe corporations and government have 
a joint responsibility in addressing social issues. Corporations are “intermediate actors in 
society bearing a subsidiary co-responsibility,” and the role of government is to engage and 
supervise corporations in task sharing in society (Aßländer & Curbach, 2017, p. 628). 
However, most of these discussions see a government’s role as that of a regulator only. 
Others argue that governments’ roles in steering CSR can vary. According to Fox and 
colleagues (2002), there are four roles of governments in engaging with CSR: (a) mandating, 
(b) facilitating, (c) partnering, and (d) endorsing. In a later study, Steurer (2010) further 
classified public policies on CSR as informational instruments, economic instruments, legal 
instruments, partnering instruments, and hybrid instruments. Different governments will use 
different CSR policy instruments. “While some countries and actors still frame and pursue the 
concept in line with neo-liberal ideas, many others have developed CSR activities further into 
co-regulatory arrangements . . . ” (Steurer, 2010, p. 66). The different government–CSR 
relationships make the political underpinnings of CSR more complex. In particular, in an 
authoritarian capitalist country, such as China, the government’s influence on CSR is more 
complex and widespread and a more nuanced consideration of this context is essential for 
clearer understanding (Hofman, Moon, & Wu, 2017; Tilt, 2016). The environmental aspect of 
CSR is particularly important in China as its accelerated economic growth has brought with it 
a number of environmental crises (Albert & Xu, 2016). Although CSR encompasses 
responsibility for society broadly, this article examines a specific subset, namely, CER. 
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Institutional Theory and National Differences in CSR/CER  
Institutional theory has been argued to be an appropriate lens for understanding and explaining 
the differences between different national economies on how external factors influence firm 
CSR decision making (Matten & Moon, 2008). Institutional theory originally focused on the 
implicit aspects of institu- tional beliefs, myths, and rules and the processes through which 
shared mean- ing was formed (Selznick, 1996). This was further developed by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), through what is now known as new 
institutional theory, which emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of these institutional 
processes, and how these processes explain differences between organizations. It explains how 
organizations may aim to attain legiti- macy within their larger contexts by becoming more 
similar over time due to the ecological process of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Whelan & Muthuri, 2017; Zhao, 2012). It also explains how 
organizations “adapt themselves to what is more common in the specific cul- tural and 
economic contexts” (Kolk, Hong, & van Dolen, 2010, p. 301). 
Matten and Moon (2008) argue that different national institutional frame- works (where 
the government–CSR relationship is one of the most important features) contextualize different 
approaches to CSR. For example, in the United States where government intervention in the 
market is relatively less, CSR tends to be more explicit, “rather than reflecting either 
governmental authority or broader formal or informal institutions” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 
409). However, in Europe, as “formal, mandatory, and codified rules or laws define the 
responsibility of corporations and other governmental and societal actors for particular social 
issues,” CSR tends to be more implicit (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 413). The differences can be 
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explained by the dif- ferent National Business Systems (NBS) in which the power of the state 
is a key feature (Matten & Moon, 2008). 
Although Matten and Moon’s (2008) framework is applied to explain the differences 
in CSR as an explicit/implicit element in the institutional frame- work of the United States and 
Europe, there has been less of a consensus in its application beyond that. Some, taking a 
narrower interpretation of the frame- work, have argued that the position of traditionally state-
centric countries such as China is beyond its scope and that there is a need for a different type 
of theo- retical base (Kolk & Tsang, 2017). In contrast, others have adopted a wider 
interpretation and note that although Matten and Moon did not explicitly address the less 
developed or government-dominated economies, an extension of their framework is relevant 
beyond the United States and Europe. These authors suggest differences in CSR practices can 
be explained by considering the specific character of capitalism in these countries through the 
differences in NBSs (Hofman et al., 2017). This is because, as Dentchev, Haezendonck, & van 
Balen (2017) argue, the institutional context of nation states still largely determines what CSR 
means for organizations. This approach has been adopted by a number of recent studies, 
including some that were published in the recent special issue of Business & Society on CSR 
in China: Perspectives and Evidence (Hofman et al., 2017; Yin, 2017; Zuo et al., 2017). 
We concur with Hofman and colleagues (2017), in that, given the under- standing of 
CSR’s core characteristics in China is still limited, there is value in applying Matten and 
Moon’s framework. Although the Chinese model is more similar to the traditional European 
one, the Chinese state government’s power in shaping the institutional framework could be 
seen as much stronger and more holistic when compared with either the United States or Europe 
(Hofman et al., 2017). The Chinese exercise of state power is different from that of traditional 
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European economies, in that, it has a different NBS as a transition economy characterized by 
authoritarian capitalism, which is a form of state capitalism (elaborated on further below). 
Therefore, in this study, we attempt to explore the dominant institutional link (which is 
created by the Chinese state government) between corporate governance and CER that is 
largely explicit in nature. In doing so, we suggest an addition to Matten and Moon’s (2008) 
framework to extend the spectrum beyond liberal and coordinated market economies to 
include those with state-controlled markets. In addition, we find that unlike Matten and Moon’s 
prediction that in government-dominated transitional economies, business’ roles and 
responsibilities are delineated by regulation (Miller, 2005), the evi- dence from CER in China 
shows that greater emphasis is given to explicit CSR, albeit different from other, especially 
developed, economies. 
From State Capitalism to Authoritarian Capitalism 
Political economists have, for some time now, been grappling with the differences among 
different nations in terms of how governments and economic institutions interact with other 
market players in delivering economic performance and that understanding institutional 
variation is especially important in understanding the different varieties in capitalism (Soskice 
& Hall, 2001). Although the initial studies mainly looked at developed economies, the rapid 
economic rise of countries that have significant government involvement in enterprises (e.g., 
Singapore, China) has challenged the traditional notions of capitalism, leading to the 
development of state capitalism as one of the varieties of capitalism. 
According to Bremmer (2010), state capitalism is “a form of bureaucratically 
engineered capitalism particular to each government that practices it. It’s a system in which the 
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state dominates markets primarily for political gain” (p. 250). Under a state capitalist system, 
government intervention is strategic in nature and markets are used for the benefit of the nation 
(Ma, 2011). Instead of eliminating markets, governments try to harness them for their own 
purposes (“State Capitalism,” 2012). It depends on the government to pick winners and 
promote economic growth. It also uses capitalist tools such as listing state-owned companies 
on the stock market and embracing globalization (“State Capitalism,” 2012). Although a state 
capitalist economy is different from a command economy, where the government directly 
exerts day-to-day control, the government still has considerable direct influence over the 
economy and companies’ strategies (Bremmer, 2010). 
Research has subsequently shown that there are also major variations among the 
countries that practice state capitalism (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012). 
Within these, China is unique in terms of its linkages and coordination within a party–
government–military–economy regime (N. Lin, 2011). The experience of China, with its one-
party state with large SOEs, has fascinated scholars who have called it various names, including 
managed capitalism (N. Lin, 2011) and capitalism with Chinese characteristics (Peck & 
Zhang, 2013). We have followed Witt and Redding (2014) and Hofman and colleagues (2017) 
in characterizing China’s NBS as authoritarian capitalism. 
This study takes the view that even though China’s economy is now moving toward 
being more market oriented, companies’ decision making is still largely driven by the Chinese 
government (Whelan & Muthuri, 2017). However, that influence has moved beyond the use of 
only shareholding (state ownership) to embrace other forms of influence. As a part of corporate 
governance strategy, CER is, therefore, substantially affected. This is consistent with the view 
of authoritarian capitalism, and has been argued to be an effective institutional framework for 
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understanding CSR in China (Hofman et al., 2017). Although Hofman and colleagues (2017) 
focused on the Chinese political, financial, education, labor, and cultural systems, they note 
that further research should be conducted on how the Chinese government deploys CSR for 
governance purposes as well as acts as the main mediator to society for business. Our study 
attempts to partially fill this gap by focusing on an aspect of Chinese authoritarian capitalism, 
in that, the government leads the market, and tries to use capitalist tools to achieve its political 
aims. This results in the government applying three types of power to influence CER, which 
are discussed below as hypotheses are developed for each. 
Hypothesis Development 
This study argues that the Chinese government’s influence on CER is applied through three 
main roles: as regulator (regulating influence), shareholder (shareholding influence), and 
market motivator (incentivizing influence). To test whether and how these governmental 
influences are operationalized, three hypotheses are developed. 
Regulating influence 
Since 2005, the Chinese central government has been trying to shift China’s economy 
to become more sustainable and, hence, is using its political power to influence this shift. 
Facing environmental problems, a new political commitment of building up a harmonious 
society was introduced by China’s then chairman, Hu Jintao. As a result, environmental issues 
or a green policy was introduced as the nation’s priority, and CER is one of the plans that has 
been put into effect. Consequently, the Measure of Disclosing Environmental Information 
(MDEI) was enacted in May 2008, and this has been further strengthened by a series of 
guidelines. When China changed its leadership under Xi Jinping in 2012, environmental 
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protection was emphasized even more. To create a green economy, the government decided to 
strengthen environmental regulations and laws. Subsequently, in 2015, the Environmental 
Protection Law was substantially revised, with a new chapter on information disclosure and 
public participation. On January 1, 2018, the Environmental Protection Tax Law went into 
effect. Furthermore, in June 2017, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) jointly signed the cooperation agreement on 
jointly enforcing environmental information disclosure of listed companies. The agreement 
aims to improve listed companies’ environmental disclosure system, promote listed companies 
to consider their accountability, and implement their environmental responsibilities. It is 
expected that this will result in a stronger coercive effect on companies’ decision making in 
terms of CER. 
Moreover, in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) is an important source that 
provides guidelines for its listed companies. Although the SSE is not a government agency, the 
Chinese government’s impact on it is significant, as the SSE was developed, owned, and 
controlled by the Chinese government (Wang, 2007). Therefore, the requirements of the SSE 
will reflect the Chinese government’s policy. As the green policy was introduced as the nation’s 
priority, the SSE offers incentives to listed companies to promote CSR. For example, those 
companies that do so will be given priority election into the SSE corporate governance sector.1 
Being selected into the corporate governance sector may “simplify the requirements for 
examination and verification of temporary announcements” (Sustainable Stock Exchanges 
Initiative, 2013). Since 2008, the SSE has required that companies that comprise the corporate 
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governance sector should release a stand-alone CSR report. As a result, it is expected that 
companies that are in the corporate governance sector will disclose more CER. 
Based on the discussion above, the hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: The Chinese government’s regulating power has a positive effect on 
companies’ decision whether or not to disclose environmental information. 
Hypothesis 1b: The Chinese government’s regulating power has a positive effect on 
the extent of CER. 
Shareholding influence 
One of the most important characteristics of the authoritarian capitalism model is that SOEs 
play an instrumental role in society (Du & Wang, 2013). For example, Norwegian SOEs hold 
37% of the Oslo stock market, but they also control some nonlisted giants such as Statkraft, a 
power generator, which if listed would be the third biggest company on the stock market 
(“Norway: The Rich Cousin,” 2013). Similarly, the Singapore government also owns 
controlling shares in many government-linked companies and directs investment through 
sovereign wealth funds (Shatkin, 2014). 
In China, the state exerts shareholder power over SOEs through the State- Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Despite reforms to the SOEs, 
in which the state is now not the only share- holder, it is still significantly involved in the 
ownership and governance of the restructured enterprises, an inevitable feature of transition 
economies (Y. Lin & Zhu, 2000). SOEs are deeply embedded in the Chinese government’s 
bureaucratic structure. The SASAC, which is directly under the State Council, is responsible 
for managing SOEs, including appointing top executives and approving any mergers or sales 
of stock or assets, as well as drafting laws related to SOEs. Hence, the Chinese government 
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still controls SOEs through their shareholdings, despite the reforms. As the biggest shareholder 
of SOEs, the Chinese government can use SOEs as tools to achieve its political and social 
goals. In China, the role of SOEs is more than just business; SOEs play a key role in helping 
the Chinese government to implement its policies. It is argued that Chinese SOEs’ decision 
making is guided to align with the interest of the Chinese government (Whelan & Muthuri, 
2017). As environmental protection has now become part of the nation’s priority, it is expected 
that SOEs will provide more environmental information than non-SOEs. 
At the same time, not to lose control, the Chinese government, or its controlled entities, 
will hold at least 50% of the shares of a company, and these are nontradable in the share market. 
Therefore, if a company has non- tradable shares held by the state, there will be more control 
from the Chinese government over the company. With the change in the nation’s priorities to 
include the environment, those companies may disclose more environmental information. 
However, the relationship between different levels of government and firms in terms of 
CSR or environmental policy has not really been studied. In the study of the interactions 
between central and local governments in China in the execution of policy with regard to small 
cars and sustainability, Kolk and Tsang (2017) found there are conflicts of interest between the 
central Chinese government and the local Chinese governments, which could weaken efforts 
to support CSR. Despite these findings, many studies have either combined the different levels 
of government into an entity called the state or have mainly focused on the influence of the 
central government, thereby ignoring the nuances of power and influence exercised by the local 
or provincial governments (Hofman et al., 2017; Marquis & Qian, 2014). Therefore, in this 
study, in an attempt to tease out the differences in influence exerted by the central and local 
governments, SOEs are separated into two groups for analysis: central SOEs (of which the 
central Chinese government is the controlling shareholder) and local SOEs (of which the 
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different local Chinese governments are the controlling shareholders). The following 
hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 2a: The Chinese government’s shareholding power has a positive effect on 
companies’ decision whether or not to disclose environmental information. 
Hypothesis 2b: The Chinese government’s shareholding power has a positive effect on 
the extent of CER. 
Incentivizing influence 
As mentioned earlier, rather than eliminate the market, an authoritarian capitalist economy uses 
the market as a tool to realize its political goals. A range of market-based instruments, charges, 
and incentives are used as tools to pro- mote environmental protection. According to the 
requirements of the 11th Five-Year Plan of the State’s environmental protection policy, about 
1.35 trillion RMB, which counts as 1.35% of each year’s GDP, were to be invested in 
environmental protection programs. China has grown to be a significant investor in clean 
energy, which can generate 25% of the world’s clean energy power (Pew Charitable Trust, 
2010). In addition, according to the MDEI, companies that are willing to provide voluntary 
environmental information could be given priority in gaining government-funded 
environmental protection projects, other government-funded projects, and rewards. In the 
newest Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), environmental protection remains one of the key areas. 
Accordingly, the State council issued the 13th Five-Year Plan on Ecological Environment 
Protection, in which it clearly states that the government should increase their financial capital 
investment to protect the environment. According to the MEP’s 2017 budget, it planned to 
spend 1.4 billion RMB on energy saving and environmental protection, which accounts to more 
than 80% of its public budget expenditures. At the same time, the government promotes green 
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finance. By the end of June 2016, the green credit balance of 21 Chinese banks totaled 7.3 
trillion RMB (Cai, 2017). It is, therefore, hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship 
between CER and the government’s economic incentives as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: The Chinese government’s economic incentives have a positive effect 
on companies’ decision whether or not to disclose environ- mental information. 
Hypothesis 3b: The Chinese government’s economic incentives have a positive effect 
on the extent of CER. 
Research Method 
Sample 
All the companies from the SSE’s 180 Index (SSE 180) were chosen as sample companies. 
This sample was chosen as previous studies (Situ & Tilt, 2012) have found that size is one of 
the determinants of CER in China. To mitigate the size effect, this study only examines SSE 
180 companies. In addition, according to the China Securities Index Co., Ltd. (2012), the SSE 
180 is “a benchmark index reflecting the Shanghai market and serving as a performance 
benchmark for investment and a basis for financial innovation.” Finally, SSE 180 companies 
are widely used in studies where listed companies are examined in the Chinese context. For 
example, Koutmos (2012), Xu and Lin (2016), and Grimminger and Benedetta (2013), all use 
the SSE 180 in their studies.  
Panel Data 
Panel data analysis is used as it gives the researcher a large number of data points, increasing 
the degrees of freedom and reducing the colinearity among explanatory variables. The panel 
used refers to the same SSE 180 companies for the period 2007 to 2011. As some companies 
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were only listed after 2007, and the analysis aimed at following the same companies over the 
5 years, the final sample was based on the 180 unique companies listed in 2011. This results in 
815 observations over the 5 years, or an unbalanced panel, as shown in Table 1. 
<Table 1 is approximately here> 
All companies listed on the SSE provide their reports in Chinese and only some (i.e., 
those listed overseas) issue English reports. Therefore, only the Chinese versions of the reports 
are examined for consistency. In addition, the lead researcher is a native Chinese speaker and, 
therefore, was able to read the Chinese reports. Both annual reports and stand-alone CSR 
reports of sample companies are included in the analysis. 
The period 2007 to 2011 was chosen as this period saw many new environment-related 
regulations, policies, and guidelines enacted in China. In particular, the MDEI and SSE 
guidelines were issued in 2008. Correspondingly, there was a boom in environmental reporting 
by SSE 180 companies in 2008. Moreover, a number of recent studies (Kolk & Tsang, 2017; 
Whelan & Muthuri, 2017) use a similar period to examine the relationship between the Chinese 
government and the CSR activities. Hence, studying changes to environmental reporting during 
this period can provide typical evidence to test the influence of the Chinese government on 
CER. 
Although examining a longer time period may be helpful, it does not appear so in terms 
of environmental reporting. As shown in Figure 1, the reporting significantly increased in 2008, 
then became flat in the following years. Therefore, it is expected there will be no obvious 
difference in more recent years. Some other studies examine CER in more recent periods, and 
confirm this trend. For example, the Environmental Responsibility Disclosure Evaluation 
Report of Chinese Listed Companies reported that during 2013 to 2015, 665 (26.46% of all 
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listed companies), 708 (27.1% of all listed companies), and 747 (26.62% of all listed 
companies) listed companies, respectively, chose to disclose an environment report. They also 
argue that the quality of CER in 2015 is similar to that of 2014, which shows that CER in China 
is still under development (Chen & Liu, 2013, 2014, 2015). More recently, the Centre for 
Environmental Economic Studies of Fudan University (2017) examined 174 heavy polluted 
companies listed on the SSE, and found that the quality of CER increased slightly, with an 
index is 36.34, 39.67, and 41.52 in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. 
To confirm that our sample followed a similar trend to these studies, we also randomly 
collected a small sample of 10 companies from 2012 to 2014. There was little change in the 
number of disclosing companies (seven companies chose to disclose environmental 
information in the annual report and seven companies chose to disclose environmental 
information in a CSR report, which is exactly the same proportion as in 2011). Although there 
is some indication that the average number of words in CSR reports increased in 2014, overall, 
there was no significant difference to the levels found in the earlier period as shown by 
independent t testing, which is conducted in line with similar CSR studies to test whether there 
are differences between the two groups of data (see, for example, LaGore, Mahoney, & Thorne, 
2011, who use a t test to test whether there are any differences in CSR 2 years before and after 
the financial restatement was announced). A t test was employed to examine whether there 
were major changes to the extent of the reporting in later years (2012-2014). As seen in Table 
2, the result shows a significance level of .716, which indicates that there is no significant 
difference between the distribution of the total number of disclosing words in 2011 and those 
in 2012 to 2014. Thus, it indicates that there have not been major changes to the reporting (both 
in terms of selection and extent) in more recent years. 
<Table 2 approximately here> 
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Dependent Variables  
The dependent variable is the extent of environmental information that is dis- closed by the 
Chinese companies. It is measured in terms of total disclosure (both annual and CSR reports), 
disclosure in only annual reports and disclosure in only CSR reports. Total disclosure (total) is 
defined as the number of words on environmental information in the annual reports and CSR 
reports of a company, obtained by using NVivo. First, a text search was performed by using 
the key words: 环境 (environment), 生态 (ecology), 自然 (nature), 绿色(green), 污(pollution), 
废 (waste), 减排  (emission reduction), 节能  (energy saving), and 环保  (environmental 
protection). Then, sentences near the key words were read; if the sentences were related to 
environmental information, the number of words that were used in CER was counted. Finally, 
the Matrix Coding function of NVivo was used to perform a word count. 
Independent Variables  
Pressure from the state is the specific factor that is examined in this study and is represented 
by a series of explanatory (independent) variables discussed in the hypotheses development 
above.  
Regulating influence. Although there is currently no mandatory regulation for CER in China, 
there are a series of guidelines that have been released since 2005. These guidelines have been 
helpful in guiding companies to disclose environmental information (Situ & Tilt 2012).  
The Guidelines on Environmental Information Disclosure by companies listed on the SSE and 
the Chinese CSR Report Preparation Guide (CASS) are the two guidelines that apply to all 
industries. Therefore, whether a CSR report complies with either guideline is used as two 
separate dummy variables to measure the regulating influence of the state. Finally, a variable 
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that measures whether a firm is part of the SSE’s corporate governance sector (GOV) is 
included. 
Shareholding influence. State ownership is measured as a dummy where all companies are 
divided into central state-owned enterprises (C-SOE), local state-owned enterprises (L-SOE), 
and non–state-owned enterprise (N-SOE). A C-SOE is a company that is controlled by the 
central SASAC, the Ministry of Finance, or other ministry, administration, bureau, and 
governmental institute at the central level. A company is an L-SOE if it is controlled by a local 
SASAC, local municipal government or administration, or bureau and governmental institute 
at the local level. 
In addition, the percentage of nontradable shares held by the state, including the central 
and local government, is adopted to measure shareholding influence. 
Incentivizing influence. In China, the debt market and stock market are under- developed, and 
thus government grants are a very important source of external finance (Du & Wang, 2013). 
Also, as outlined above, companies that have better CER are given priority in receiving 
environmental grants from the government. Therefore, incentivizing influence is measured by 
two variables: the total amount of government grants received by companies and the amount 
of government grants received by companies on environmental issues (i.e., environmental 
grants). 
Control variables 
Several control variables that are consistently shown to be related to CER in prior literature are 
included in this study. These include company financial performance, company size and 
industry. Moreover, Chinese companies are also becoming increasingly global in nature and 
therefore variables for dual listing and GRI registration are also included. 
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Financial performance. Deegan (2009) argues that the higher the profit earned by the firm, the 
greater the political cost they face. To reduce criticism that a company has excessive profit and 
does not pay a fair share to other parties, companies are more likely to disclose more 
information to legitimize them- selves. Following Waddock and Graves (1997), this study uses 
return on assets (ROA) for the measurement of financial performance. 
However, a reciprocal process between the outcome variable (word count) and an 
independent variable may result in an endogeneity problem. For example, the current financial 
performance of a firm might be endogenous to the extent of reporting: Higher reporting may 
cause a change in profitability, but current profitability may influence the level of reporting. A 
straightfor- ward control for this problem is to use lagged values of the variable(s). One possible 
drawback of this is that when a lagged variable is a proxy for the variable of interest, the 
interpretation of coefficients may be more difficult. This drawback is not material in this case 
as lags are only necessary for con- trol variables, not for explanatory variables. Thus, a 1-year 
lag of ROA is used, as previous years’ performance has been shown to be related to envi- 
ronmental reporting. 
Company size. Company size is highly positively correlated with CER (Mus- teen, Francis, & 
Datta, 2010; Situ & Tilt, 2012). The larger the company, the more information will be disclosed 
to avoid public concern. Total assets is used in this study to control for the size of Chinese 
listed companies. For reasons discussed above for companies’ financial performance, a lagged 
variable representing the previous year’s total asset value is used to control for endogeneity. 
Industry. Industry is also a variable that strongly affects CER. Previous stud- ies (Dobbs & van 
Staden, 2011; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Parker, 1986; Sol- omon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 
2011) find that companies that are in an industry with consumer visibility, a high level of 
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political risk, or concen- trated intense competition provide better CER. In this study, the 
industry code of each sample company was obtained from the list of industry catego- rizations 
issued by the CSRC. Consistent with past studies (such as Faisal, Tower, & Rusmin, 2012; 
Hackston & Milne, 1996), this study classified the industries based on the codes issued by the 
CSRC into high profile (including finance and insurance industry3) and low profile. 
Dual-listed companies. Since 2002, more and more Chinese companies are being listed on 
foreign stock markets (Liu, 2006). As they have more restric- tive CSR disclosure 
requirements, Chinese companies that are listed on for- eign stock markets have to disclose 
more CER. For example, the United States’ Securities and Exchange Committee requires listed 
companies to separately disclose environmental contingencies and environmental expendi- 
tures, and to disclose any information that may have impact on the company’s financial 
position. Therefore, it can be inferred that overseas stock markets’ requirements have some 
influence on Chinese CER. To test the influence on CER in China from foreign investors, 
whether a company has overseas listed shares (dual listed) is used as a proxy. 
Dual-listed companies refer to those that are listed on both the SSE and offshore stock 
exchanges (such as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange). All sam- ple companies’ reports from 
2007 to 2011 were read to determine the percent- age of overseas listed shares. Acompany is 
classified as a dual-listed company if it has any overseas listed shares; otherwise, it is classified 
as an A-share4 company. 
Registration with the GRI. A number of global organizations, such as interna- tional NGOs, 
the World Bank, the International Organization for Standard- ization (ISO), and the GRI 
attempt to exert influence on companies worldwide. The GRI provides one of the most popular 
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global guidelines for CER. It has a comprehensive structure, definitions, and indicators to help 
companies in preparing their CSR reports. Therefore, it is assumed that if a company has signed 
up to the GRI, it will disclose more environmental information. Whether or not a company has 
registered with the GRI is used as a proxy measure of influence from an international 
organization. 
Analysis of Data 
In this study, the companies’ decision making about CER is treated as a two- stage process. 
First, the company makes a decision as to whether it will dis- close any environmental 
information (of any kind, such as including it in the annual report or producing a separate 
report)—the selection process. The econometric model for selection is modeled as a limited 
dependent variable panel probit model (selection model). This model includes all companies 
in the data set. Then, for companies that do choose to disclose environmental information, the 
company decides how extensive the reporting will be - measured as the word count relating to 
CER. This second model, a linear panel random effects (RE; with Mundlak corrections) model 
(extent of reporting model), includes only those companies that have CER in either the annual 
report or a stand-alone CSR report. 
Selection model. In this study, whether or not a company chooses to produce an environmental 
report can be classified as a binary, yes/no, outcome - where, by convention, yes is coded as 1 
and no as 0. For a limited dependent variable, the binomial probit model is used.5 Both annual 
reports and CSR reports are examined, and following the outline of the limited dependent 
variable model, three selection equations are estimated as follows: 
Total_Selectit = β0 + β1staownedC + β2staownedL + β3stashareD + β4envgraD + 
β5totgraD + β6highprofile + δ1loglagtotass + δ2lagroa + λ1loglagtotassmm + 
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λ2lagroamm + vit + ui        [1] 
AR_Selectit= β0 + β1staownedC + β2staownedL + β3stashareD + β4envgraD + β5totgraD 
+ β6highprofile + δ1loglagtotass + δ2lagroa + λ1loglagtotassmm + λ2lagroamm + vit + 
ui           [2] 
CSR_Selectit = β0 + β1staownedC + β2staownedL + β3stashareD + β4envgraD + 
β5totgraD + β6highprofile + δ1loglagtotass + δ2lagroa + λ1loglagtotassmm + 
λ2lagroamm + vit + ui         [3] 
where Total_Select takes the value 0 for nonreporting companies and 1 if there is a nonzero 
word count relating to environmental reporting either in their annual reports or CSR reports; 
AR_Select takes the value 0 for nonreporting companies and 1 if there is a nonzero word count 
relating to environmental reporting in their annual reports only; CSR_Select takes the value 0 
for nonreporting companies and 1 if there is a nonzero word count relating to environmental 
reporting in their CSR reports only; staownedC = 1 refers to central SOEs, 0 otherwise; 
staownedL = 1 refers to local SOEs,  0 otherwise; stashareD = 1 refers to companies that have 
nontradable shares held by the state, 0 otherwise; totgraD = 1 refers to companies that received 
government grants, 0 otherwise; envgraD = 1 refers to companies that received government 
grants related to environmental issues, 0 otherwise; highprofile = 1 refers to high-profile 
industries, and 0 refers to low-profile industries; loglagtotass = the natural logarithm total assets 
lagged  by  1 year; lagroa = 1-year lag ROA; year is the same companies over 5 years are used 
in the panel model, therefore, sample years from 2008 to 2011 are included as dummy 
variables; csrD = 1 refers to a company that has environmental reporting in its CSR report, and 
0 otherwise; arD = 1 refers to a company that has environmental reporting in its annual report, 
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and 0 otherwise. 
The same companies over 5 years are used in the panel model, therefore, all sample years 
are included as dummy variables to consider the influence of time.  
Extent of reporting model. The extent of reporting, measured by word count, is a continuous 
dependent variable, and, therefore, the linear model is used. 
Two interpretations can be given to the coefficient representing the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity or the individual effects in the model. If they are assumed to be a 
normally distributed random variable (with unknown variance), the model is referred to as the 
RE model. In this model, an important assumption is that the individual (i.e., company) 
heterogeneity is independent of the explanatory variables. An alternative is to use an 
adjustment to the RE model. The Mundlak specification of the RE allows for potential 
correlation between the individual-specific effects and explanatory variables (Chamberlain, 
1980; Mundlak, 1978). In this version of the RE, the individual or company (over time) means 
for each of the time-varying explanatory variables are included as additional explanatory 
variables—the Mundlak corrections. Once the correction is made, the RE panel estimator is 
unbiased, consistent, and efficient. 
As both annual reports and CSR reports are examined in this study, following the 
outline of the linear panel RE (with Mundlak corrections) model, three equations are estimated 
as follows: 
Total_Extentit = β0 + β1staownedC + β2staownedL + β3stashareD + β4envgraD + 
β5totgraD + β6CASS + β7SSE + β8GOV + β9GRI + β10oveshareD + β11grantsstaown + 
β12griosshare + β13highprofile + δ1loglagtotass + δ2lagroa + λ1loglagtotassmm + 
λ2lagroamm + vit + ui       [4] 
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AR_Extentit = β0 + β1staownedC + β2staownedL + β3stashareD + β4envgraD + 
β5totgraD + β6CASS + β7SSE + β8GOV + β9GRI + β10oveshareD + β11grantsstaown + 
β12griosshare + β13highprofile + δ1loglagtotass + δ2lagroa + λ1loglagtotassmm + 
λ2lagroamm + vit + ui                                        [5] 
CSR_Extentit = β0 + β1staownedC + β2staownedL + β3stashareD + β4envgraD + 
β5totgraD + β6CASS + β7SSE + β8GOV + β9GRI + β10oveshareD + β11grantsstaown + 
β12griosshare + β13highprofile + δ1loglagtotass + δ2lagroa + λ1loglagtotassmm + 
λ2lagroamm + vit + ui                                           [6] 
where variables are as in the selection model; in addition, CASS = 1 refers to companies that 
indicted they used the CASS as a guideline to prepare their report, 0 otherwise; SSE = 1 refers 
to companies that indicated they used the SSE as a guideline to prepare their report, 0 
otherwise; GOV = 1 refers to companies in the corporate governance sector, 0 otherwise; GRI 
= 1 refers to a company that has indicated that it used the GRI as a guideline to prepare its 
report, and 0 otherwise; overshared = 1 refers to dual-listed companies, 0 refers to A-share 
companies; grantsstaown6 is the interaction between the government grants received by the 
companies and the state ownership; and griosshare is the interaction between a dual-listed 
company and whether a company is registered on the GRI. 
Results and Discussion 
Trends over Time 
Generally, CER by Chinese companies shows an increasing trend. Figure 1 shows the trends 
for the number of Chinese companies that disclosed environmental information over the study 
period. The results show a dramatic increase in 2008, but then show little further change. 
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<Figure 1 approximately here> 
The most notable result in the trend analysis is that the number of disclosing companies 
significantly increased in 2008. To respond to the environ- mental protection commitment 
introduced in the early 2000s, the government implemented a series of regulations, policies, 
and programs to enhance companies’ green performance in the mid-2000s, and it reached a 
peak in 2008, when the MDEI was enacted. No other laws regarding CER were enacted from 
2009 to 2011. Thus, the preliminary results suggest that the Chinese government significantly 
influenced the decision to produce CER in China at that time through coercive isomorphism. 
Summary of Findings 
When considering the results of the panel modeling, the evidence for influence from the state 
indicates more complexity than has previously been considered. Generally, the findings show 
that the state influences companies’ CER selection decision through its various roles (including 
using its regulating, shareholding, and incentivizing influences). Table 3 presents a summary7 
of the statistics for the selection model, which show that staownedC, staownedL, envgraD, and 
totgraD have the expected sign with a significance level of p ≤ .05. This indicates that the 
Chinese government tends to have a strong positive influence on Chinese companies’ 
decision to undertake CER, in particular, in their annual reports. 
<Table 3 is approximately here> 
However, the findings show that the state’s influence on the extent of CER is not 
obvious. Once a company has decided to undertake CER, the second stage of its decision-
making process is to determine what, and how much, to disclose. Table 4 provides a summary 
of the results of the extent of reporting model, showing that most of the variables are not 
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significant. Only envgraD is significant for both AR_Extent (p = .006) and CSR_Extent (p = 
.14). 
<Table 4 is approximately here> 
It can be seen that the state’s regulating influence only has an impact when considering 
total reporting (annual reports and CSR reports together). Regarding shareholding influence, 
contrary to findings in previous studies, the results indicate that being an SOE does not improve 
the level of CER, which only appears to be affected by the state’s incentivizing influence. This 
result will be elaborated on in the following section. 
Discussion of Hypothesis Tests 
As noted above, the Chinese system is characterized by authoritarian capital- ism. Although 
the government does not direct supplies of scarce resources or attach values to goods and 
services, it still has considerable control over companies. For example, the government can 
shape the overall market by managing its currency, directing money to favored industries, and 
working closely with Chinese companies abroad. Therefore, the Chinese government has 
sufficient power to be essential to Chinese companies’ survival. To gain support and approval 
from the government, Chinese companies disclose environmental information that meets the 
requirements set out by state doctrine (Situ, Tilt, & Seet, 2016). 
Although previous studies in more developed and free-market economies equate power 
with different stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), in an authoritarian capitalist 
country, such as China, the number of stakeholders is relatively limited (Dong et al., 2014). In 
this context, there is a single major stakeholder, the Chinese government, that plays different 
roles in motivating Chinese companies to adopt CER, and these manifest themselves as three 
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different types of stakeholder influence (regulating, shareholding, and incentivizing power) on 
CER. These are discussed below in relation to the findings of this study. 
Regulating influence. In the selection models, CASS and SSE are not included as all companies 
that claim that they comply with state-issued guidelines when preparing their reports chose to 
disclose environmental information in either their annual report or CSR report. However, this 
itself indicates that the Chinese government’s political power significantly influences Chinese 
companies’ decision about whether to disclose environmental information. Similarly, the 
results show that all companies in the corporate governance sector have CER in either their 
annual report or their CSR report, as the SSE requires all companies that have been selected 
into the corporate governance sector to disclose environmental information. As such, 
Hypothesis 1a is supported. However, the results of the extent of reporting models show that 
both CASS and SSE are not statistically significant for either annual reports or CSR reports, 
which suggests that complying with state-issued guidelines does not improve the extent of 
CER. Moreover, companies in the corporate governance sector do not provide higher levels of 
CER than others. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is not supported. 
The results of the tests show that the Chinese government’s regulating influence affects 
Chinese companies’ decisions to disclose environmental information. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies that indicate that the government can influence companies’ decision 
making via promulgating laws and regulations. However, the findings further show that, the 
Chinese government’s regulating influence does not appear to strongly affect the volume of 
information that companies choose to include, suggesting that it does not influence the level of 
detail or the amount of voluntary information included in voluntary CSR reports. Hence, this 
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may imply that the quality of reporting is not significantly improved by state regulation. Further 
study into the content of the reports is, thus, warranted. 
Shareholding influence. According to the Fortune Global 500 list (Cho & Pat- ten, 2007), in 
2015, the top 12 Chinese companies are all SOEs. Of the 98 Chinese companies on the list, 
only 22 are private. The Chinese government was, thus, significantly involved in the ownership 
and governance of SOEs as a controlling shareholder. As green reporting becomes a major 
program in the state’s environmental governance, this study hypothesized that there is a 
positive relationship between state ownership and CER in China. 
The results show that both central and local state ownership significantly and positively 
influence companies’ decisions about whether to disclose CER. However, state ownership only 
influences companies’ choice to include CER in their annual reports, but not in their CSR 
reports. For annual reports, industry is also significant, suggesting potential interaction with 
state ownership; however, this is not the case as industry profile is distributed evenly across 
central, local, and non-SOEs. It is noted that the annual report is the main tool for companies 
to communicate with their shareholders, and only those more advanced companies issue stand-
alone CSR reports to communicate with wider stakeholders. As the Chinese government (both 
central and local) is the controlling shareholder of SOEs, it is not surprising to see it has more 
influence on SOEs’ annual reports, rather than their CSR reports. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is 
generally supported, in particular, in terms of annual reports. Surprisingly, the results of the 
extent of the reporting model show that for companies that chose to disclose environmental 
information, neither central SOEs nor local SOEs provided a greater extent of reporting than 
non-SOEs. This finding is not consistent with previous studies (Situ & Tilt, 2012), which found 
that state ownership is a very important determinant of the extent of the Chinese CER. 
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However, those studies included all companies (even those who chose to report nothing), when 
examining state ownership’s influence, so their results may be misleading, as they do not 
distinguish between the influence on companies’ selection decision and the influence on the 
extent of CER. In this study, the companies’ CER decision-making process is considered as a 
two-stage process and, as such, it is clear that state ownership mainly influences companies’ 
decision to disclose, and not the extent of disclosure, making an important contribution to the 
literature. stashareD is also used as a proxy to measure the state’s shareholding influence. Since 
the reform of SOEs in China, the Chinese government is not the only shareholder of SOEs; 
however, to maintain its voting power, the Chinese government holds a certain level of 
nontradable shares in SOEs. Although the results indicate there is a positive relationship 
between nontradable shares and CER, it is not statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 
2b is not supported. 
In summary, in terms of regulating influence, the Chinese government’s shareholding 
influence is found to significantly affect the companies’ CER selection decision, but this does 
not necessarily result in a higher amount of CER. This suggests the awareness of CSR in China 
is still low. Companies appear to disclose environmental information just to address the 
Chinese government’s requirements, rather than realizing the importance of being accountable 
and disclosing additional information that may be relevant to wider stakeholders. 
Incentivizing influence. In response to the environmental problems resulting from Chinese 
economic development, “building up a harmonious society,” where environmental protection 
is one of the important elements, has become the new political goal. It is hypothesized that the 
Chinese government will use market tools to achieve its new political promise. In this study, 
the total amount of government grants received by companies and the amount of government 
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grants received by companies for environmental issues are used to measure the Chinese 
government’s incentivizing influence. 
The results from the selection model show that both environmental grants and total 
grants influence the decision to disclose, when considering both annual reports and CSR 
reports. However, if annual reports and CSR reports are considered separately, the influence of 
total grants is not significant, and only environmental grants influence annual report disclosure. 
These results indicate that the Chinese government’s incentivizing influence has little impact 
when companies are making the decision to provide CER in a separate CSR report, and implies 
that the annual report is still the main report used by Chinese companies to communicate with 
the Chinese government. Also, it is not surprising to see that the influence of environmental 
grants on CER selection is greater than for total grants, as companies that receive government 
grants are required to disclose to the government how they used the funding. Those companies 
that received environmental grants would, there- fore, disclose how they used the grant to 
protect the environment. In general, the results indicate that Hypothesis 3a is supported mainly 
for annual report disclosure. 
The results of the extent of the reporting model again show some differences to the 
selection model. Companies that received grants from the Chinese government do not provide 
higher levels of CER in either their annual reports or their CSR reports. However, if the 
government grants received were for environmental issues, companies will have more environ- 
mental information disclosed in both annual reports and CSR reports. That is, companies that 
received environmental grants are likely to have taken some environmental protection action 
using the grant funding, and, therefore, have more to disclose. It can be seen that compared 
with other influences, economic incentives that relate to environmental protection seem to be 
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a more efficient way to encourage Chinese firms to be more responsible and report more. In 
general, Hypothesis 3b is partly supported. 
Contributions and Conclusion 
This study investigates in more detail the influences on the increasing trend of CER in the 
context of an emerging economy that has few democratic and free-market institutions. There 
are three major contributions of the study that have implications for theory. 
CER Decision Making as a Two-Stage Process 
This study considers companies’ decision making about CER as a two-stage process. In doing 
so, it is clear that the Chinese government appears to mainly influence the first stage—whether 
to disclose or not, but has limited influence on companies’ decision at the second stage—how 
much to disclose. This adds a level of detail to our understanding compared with prior literature 
that mostly suggests a simpler relationship. This could also explain why previous studies have 
found that as the number of disclosing companies grows, the quality of the disclosure by 
companies is generally not high. That is, Chinese CER is still mainly driven by the Chinese 
government requirements, rather than due to companies themselves realizing the importance 
of doing business in an environmentally friendly way. This reinforces previous research that 
suggests that business organizations have a preference to engage in CSR with minimal effort 
and primarily for symbolic purposes (Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, & Cochran, 2005; Weaver, 
Treviño, & Cochran, 1999). Therefore, the CER is more likely a legitimacy tool to address the 
Chinese government’s call to be more environmentally responsible. Ideally, corporations will 
go beyond reporting and window dressing, with the Chinese government putting in measures 
besides economic ones to fulfill its moral obligation to steer the CSR of businesses (Dentchev, 
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Haezendonck, & van Balen, 2017). However, our research findings suggest that the lack of 
public pressure and the perceptions of the government’s level of control may lead to the 
employment of legitimizing strategies through firms’ decision to report against government 
signals. Thus, Matten and Moon’s (2008) framework could be extended to present a spectrum 
from liberal, through coordinated, to controlled market economies, as shown in Figure 2. 
<Figure 2 is approximately here> 
In contrast to free-market capitalist systems, where it is believed that stakeholders are 
diverse and each stakeholder exerts its own stakeholder power on companies’ decision making, 
the stakeholder power of the government in China is much stronger and plays different roles in 
influencing CER. Supporting Fox and colleagues (2002), although this study found evidence 
of the influence of endorsing roles (e.g., through selection into the SSE’s corporate governance 
sector), much of the influence of the government was through mandating (through regulating 
and shareholding influences) and incentivizing mechanisms such as government grants, with 
less evidence of the Chinese government acting in the partnering role. In a similar manner, our 
research found that based on Steurer’s (2010) typology of CSR instruments, the Chinese 
government was mainly using a mix of informational instruments, economic instruments, and 
legal instruments in influencing CER, and had yet to progress toward partnering instruments 
and hybrid instruments. However, although the government’s emphasis on environmental 
issues could encourage companies to pay more attention to their environmental activities and 
reporting, the amount of CER, and, therefore, most likely its comprehensive- ness and 
transparency, does not appear to have improved. Thus, CER is an inculcated element of the 
institutional framework of corporations. 
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Institutional Theory Applied in Authoritarian Capitalism 
Roles of Chinese government. While prior literature has almost predominantly used state 
ownership as a proxy for state influence, the nature of that influence is much more complex 
and the nuanced in terms of what has been previously investigated.  In particular: 
• State influence manifests itself in three forms: regulating, shareholding and 
incentivizing. 
• Regulatory influence is only effective in increasing the number of firms that produce 
some CER (rather than no reporting), but not in increasing the volume of CER. 
• Shareholding influence only influences the choice to disclose in annual reports, not the 
extent of reporting or the use of CSR reports. 
• Incentivizing influence, or the use of market incentives, appears to be a more efficient 
way to facilitate comprehensive CER.  
It can be seen that the traditional model of authoritarian capitalism (under which SOEs 
are the major governance arrangement) is transforming into a new model. In this new model, 
the Chinese government uses newer, more sophisticated tools (such as issuing government 
grants, and developing guidelines) to manage both SOEs and non-SOEs. In addition, these new 
governance arrangements (in particular, incentivizing influences) appear to be more efficient 
than the traditional model (i.e. shareholding influence). This is in line with Backman, Verbeke, 
and Schulz’s (2017) research which suggests that, using a resource based view of the firm, 
firms will adopt an increasingly proactive environmental management strategy if they can 
acquire resources and transform those into competences instrumental to competitive advantage 
and higher returns.  
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Chinese CSR is following the global trend to be more explicit in that “incentives and 
opportunities are motivated by the perceived expectations of different stakeholders of the 
corporation” (Matten and Moon 2008, p.416), in our case, the government being the main and 
sometimes only stakeholder.  
Role of industry. According to the survey by KPMG (2011), industries “that have the greatest 
influence over society and the environment (such as certain sectors of the energy and natural 
resources industry) show a higher commitment to reporting than other sectors that may be seen 
as wielding less influence” (p. 12). Similarly, our study found that certain strategic industries 
(e.g., heavy polluting and financial) are more willing to report environmental information. 
However, we cannot determine the level of this influence relative to government as our model 
only includes industry as a control variable. This is a limitation of the study and an important 
area to consider in future research. 
Limited evidence of mimetic isomorphism. In terms of whether a third isomorphic process, 
mimetic isomorphism, was at work, although our study finds evidence of coercive and 
normative isomorphism, whether companies copy each other or a lead company is hard to tell 
as the CER data show the growth happened at more or less the same time. There does not 
appear to be evidence of time lags and relatively different learning rates between early and late 
adopters, indicators of mimetic behavior between firms, as suggested by Lieberman and Asaba 
(2006) and Rosenkopf and Abrahamson (1999). Rather, the data suggest that the firms were 
responding to what appears to be a com- mon external shock (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), in 
this case, the introduction of government policies and regulations. It could be that firms were 
mimicking other firms as they had one or more boundary spanning ties as suggested by 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), but if those ties were mainly related to the Chinese 
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government or the Chinese Communist Party, it is more likely that the other two aspects of 
isomorphism, especially coercive isomorphism, were at work. The strength of coercive and 
normative isomorphism in the Chinese context relative to mimetic isomorphism supports 
Mizruchi and Fein’s (1999) argument that contexts matter (e.g., where there is less 
institutionalized power and coercion such as in North America), there is a disproportionate 
focus on mimetic isomorphism at the expense of normative and, especially, coercive 
isomorphism. Hence, this study contributes research that addresses the tendency to underplay 
issues of power and coercion that may be a uniquely North American phenomenon (Mizruchi 
& Fein, 1999). 
International Influence of growing CER/ CSR 
The only significant evidence of influence on the volume of CER is from international 
influences, as the control variables for dual listing and GRI registration are significant. 
Moreover, GRI registration is the only variable strongly significant for the extent of reporting 
in CSR reports, suggesting that the emergence of separate reports may be due to international 
influences. This also raises the possibility that the lack of competing interests between different 
stakeholders may diminish the reliability of CER, as companies are ultimately responsible to 
the government and not to a variety of stakeholders. As such, the government’s objective to 
change the economy to include a more environmentally sustainable approach may be hard to 
achieve while maintaining a strong authoritarian capitalist system. Thus, the study provides 
some preliminary evidence that the influence of globalization is becoming more noticeable. 
Similar trends are found in other studies (Whelan & Muthuri, 2017; Yin, 2017). In addition, 
beyond GRI, Yin’s (2017) and Whelan and Muthuri’s (2017) studies found that other 
transnational pressures (e.g., the extent of embeddedness in the global production network, 
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international covenants, and intergovernment organizations) also contribute to shaping CSR in 
China. The Chinese economy is becoming increasingly globalized and, to operate within the 
competitive global environment, companies are expected to be responsible and must provide 
comprehensive CER. As such, the pre- vailing government power might be mitigated by the 
changing economic circumstances, with some evidence of explicit CSR. This global spread is 
noted by Matten and Moon (2008) as isomorphic forces putting pressure on companies. 
Therefore, explaining CER through an authoritarian capitalism lens may change over time and 
more evidence is needed through undertaking further research in this context, in particular, 
consideration of the power of cultural and ideological impacts that exist within a state capitalist 
system. 
Summary 
Overall, the study contributes to the development of institutional theory through the application 
of Matten and Moon’s framework in an emerging transitional economy characterized by 
authoritarian capitalism. The Chinese model bears some similarities to the traditional European 
one identified by Matten and Moon in terms of European governments generally being more 
engaged in economic and social activity (Heidenheimer, Heclo, & Adams, 1990), and finds 
further evidence to support Matten and Moon’s conceptualization of explicit CSR differences, 
largely based on differences in NBS. However, there are important institutional differences, in 
that, the Chinese exercise of state power is different from that of traditional European 
economies—it has a different NBS as a transition economy and uses authoritarian capitalism. 
Paradoxically, although Matten and Moon (2008) had indicated that among transition European 
communist economies, with weak civil society and market institutions and dominant 
governments, there would be a slow and tentative development of explicit CSR. CER, as a 
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form of explicit CSR, has grown rapidly in China. Unlike in Europe, where part of the trend 
has been due to privatization, business deregulation, and market liberalization (Matten & 
Moon, 2008), the Chinese firms engaged in explicit CSR largely because of coercive 
isomorphism, whereby the Chinese government links incentives such as grants and contracts 
and access to resources to explicit CSR. Although the CER policies from the Chinese 
government do not take the form of traditional coercive explicit CSR based on hard law, 
regulations, or taxes (Steurer, 2010), the authoritarian capitalist institutional structures and 
environment mean that the incentives or ties that the state introduces do seem to point to a more 
nuanced and sophisticated implementation of CSR instruments that may be perceived by 
Chinese firms to be mandatory in nature. 
Whereas both the European and Chinese explicit CSR are comparatively government 
driven, the differences in the Chinese political system and NBS mean that explicit CSR is 
mainly in the form of reporting, rather than real explicit action, leading to Chinese firms 
responding to government edicts. Based on the two-stage process of CER elaborated above, 
unlike existing research that points to increasing government influence resulting in more 
substantive reporting (Marquis & Qian, 2014), our research finds that there are limits to 
government influence and their effects on Chinese firms. In addition, the trends in Europe saw 
a move from dependence on government authority toward nongovernment aspects that 
incorporate soft regulation of CSR and emphasize partnership, facilitation, endorsement 
(Moon, 2004), and other studies have pointed toward normative pressures leading to more 
substantive CSR (Zuo et al., 2017). However, in terms of CER, our study does not find evidence 
to support this trend among Chinese firms, especially those operating mainly domestically. 
Furthermore, among firms seeking to gain access to capital out- side China and gain 
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endorsement for entry into foreign markets, we find evidence of international normative 
isomorphic pressures, in the impact that rules of foreign stock exchanges have on dual-listed 
firms as well as registration on the GRI. To that extent, our study contributes to the call for 
research to under- stand better the dynamics of CSR (Hofman et al., 2017) by painting a more 
nuanced picture of the distinctive combination of the mainly coercive and normative 
isomorphic pressures that Chinese firms face. 
Implications for Practice 
The findings of this study have implications for both the Chinese government and for Chinese 
companies, as well as making important contributions to the literature and knowledge of CER 
in China. 
For the Chinese government, the findings suggest that their emphasis on environmental 
protection appears to be having the desired effect, as more and more companies are willing to 
provide CER. However, although the number of firms producing CER in China is increasing, 
there are still gaps to be filled before Chinese CER reaches the reporting standards of major 
international firms from more developed economies. Similar to Zhao’s (2012) finding of the 
influence of the political context and that CSR in China is more a politically embedded 
phenomenon, this study finds that the stakeholder power of the Chinese government is so strong 
that CER in China becomes a legitimacy tool for companies to demonstrate their adherence to 
the requirements of the government. This ultimately leads to low levels of reporting that meet 
minimal requirements. This reinforces some of the findings that Midttun, Gjølberg, Kourula, 
Sweet, and Vallentin (2015) found in welfare state–dominated economies, in that, in contrast 
to CSR/CER being a substitute for the welfare state (as proposed by Matten & Moon, 2008), 
the means promoted by CSR is more problematic in nations and cultures that have strong 
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government- directed institutional traditions, such as that of the Nordic countries and China. In 
China, it can be seen that the lack of other competitive stakeholders does not facilitate high-
quality CER. Therefore, when determining policy, the Chinese government is unlikely to meet 
its aims unless it considers encouraging more stakeholders to take note of CER, such as through 
increasing public awareness of the issue(s), promoting green products to consumers, and 
encouraging more local NGOs to act as watchdogs. 
For companies, this study suggests that they need to improve their account- ability if 
their reporting is to be useful to the increasing number of stakeholders of Chinese CER, 
including overseas consumers and investors. That is, CER should not merely be a tool to please 
the Chinese government. There is a growing expectation that globally competitive companies 
should conduct their business in a more environmentally friendly way and, as such, Chinese 
companies need to consider this to compete effectively. Stakeholder power is dynamic, so 
along with globalization, there may be more competing stake- holder interests that appear for 
Chinese companies in the future; therefore, they will need to address other stakeholders’ 
interests besides that of the Chinese government. The Chinese context will continue to provide 
a fruitful research ground to observe this phenomenon in the future. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are, of course, possible alternative explanations for the results that are beyond the scope 
of this study. Some of these are alluded to in the discussion but require further research, such 
as the influence of the global rise in aware- ness of CSR, including in developing countries, 
and the role of mimetic isomorphism between firms and industries in China that has been found 
to be important in explaining the rise of CER in developed economies. Although these 
explanations cannot be ruled out entirely, the analysis in this article included some mechanisms 
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to control for these aspects, and the results indicate that government influence is most 
dominant. Further research is needed to explore these issues further. 
Other limitations include that this study only uses SSE 180 companies as the sample. 
As a result, the sample comprises large-sized companies, and larger companies are believed to 
be more advanced in providing CER. Large companies also experience more influence from 
the Chinese government. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to generalize the results of this 
study to the CER of a wider group of Chinese listed companies, so a larger sample to confirm 
or refute these findings is warranted. 
In addition, measurement of some variables, particularly dichotomous measurement, 
may prevent some important issues being teased out in depth. For example, the size of 
environmental grants may be significant, but this detailed level of information was not publicly 
available. Further research on this issue would shed more light on its impact. 
Moreover, although the study shows that CER is mainly considered as   a tool for firms 
to legitimatize themselves in the eyes of the Chinese government, the evidence that 
international influence has started to have an impact on Chinese CER suggests this as an 
important area for further examination in the future, as China’s economy continues to develop. 
Similarly, the influence of global organizations on Chinese firms warrants additional 
investigation. 
Further research is also needed on the interplay between state and other influences. As 
noted earlier, alongside the move to a more market-oriented system, China retains its strong 
cultural identity of Marxism and Confucianism (Low, 2006; Tan, 1989). The moderating 
influence of these ideologies is an important aspect to consider and it has been suggested that 
they could be used to improve environmental conditions in the way they were used to support 
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economic reform (Lieber, 2013). Study of these ideological forces will pro- vide even greater 
insights into the nuances of the production of CER in China.  
Finally, we need to be careful in interpreting this phenomenon and extrapolating this to 
broader changes in terms of corporate responsibilities becoming more explicit. In this study, 
although, we find that ostensibly, although Chinese CSR may be becoming more explicit, but 
as the Chinese business and political systems are very different from other countries, the 
explicit CSR mainly takes the form of reporting rather than real explicit action. Although this 
suggests a sign of more explicit responsibility taking, it is possible that companies merely 
report more externally to respond to government requirements. Therefore, future research 
should investigate which topics are reported on as part of CER, as such, a fine-grained analysis 
would provide more nuance to the evaluation of the implicit/explicit framework. Although 
there was a lack of evidence of mimetic isomorphism, this could be because of the difficulty 
of finding this in annual and CSR reports, and further research could include 
interviewing/surveying those preparing the reports (e.g., company secretaries, auditors, 
accounting firms, annual report writers) to see whether any looked at how other firms in China 
were doing things. 
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Notes 
1. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) corporate governance sector was introduced in 
2007, to significantly improve China’s listed companies’ governance mechanism and promote 
the long-term healthy development of the capital market. It is formed through voluntary 
application of listed companies, public opinion solicitation, and comments by consultancies, 
primary selection, and examination by the expert consultative committee. 
2. As discussed above, only Chinese version reports are examined in this study. Therefore, 
Chinese was used when performing text search. 
3. In China, companies in the finance and insurance industry help the government to direct 
capital away from the polluted companies, and, therefore, are viewed as environmentally 
sensitive. 
4. A-shares are shares in mainland China-based companies that trade on Chinese stock 
exchanges such as the SSE and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. A-shares are generally only 
available for purchase by Mainland China citizens. 
5. Nonlinear probabilities can be modeled using either the logit or probit model. Although 
the logit is more common than the probit, this is generally historic— logit models are easier to 
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compute, but this is no longer an important consideration. The core difference is that the logit’s 
errors are assumed to follow the standard logistic (zero mean and variance /3), whereas the 
probit follows the standard normal distribution. Note that, in practical terms, logit and probit 
models come to the same conclusions, but the probit is easier to interpret. 
6. There is the possibility of interaction between the government grants received by the 
companies and state ownership, as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) is more likely to gain 
government grants, and SOEs are more likely to be aware of, and meet, the required criteria. 
In addition, there is potential interaction between a company being dual-listed and whether the 
company is registered on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), as stock exchanges from more 
developed economies may favor the GRI approach to environmental CER. Thus, two 
interaction terms are also included. 
7. Full model statistics are available on request. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Distribution of Observations by Year 
Year (n) 
2007 143 
2008 150 
2009 165 
2010 177 
2011 180 
Total 815 
 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Ten Sample Companies 2011-2014 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Total_Extent Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.134 .716 .142 38 .89 63.9667 451.6038 -850.26 978.19 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  .125 12.90 .90 63.9667 510.7578 
-
1040.29 
1168.23 
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Table 3: Summary of the Selection Models (N=760) 
Explanatory variables: Total_Selec
t 
AR_Select CSR_Select 
Share-holding 
influence 
staownedC 1.056** 0.842*** 2.803 
staownedL 0.659* 0.948*** -1.106 
stashareD -0.057 -0.211 -0.826* 
Incentivizing 
influence 
envgraD 0.490** 0.546*** 0.49 
totgraD  0.468* 0.045 -0.495 
Control variables:       
highprofile 1.209*** 1.448*** -0.193 
loglagtotass 0.752*** 0.061 1.607* 
lagroa 0.793 0.401 0.63 
loglagtotamm -0.349 0.13 2.225* 
lagroamm -0.017 0.525 -0.49 
year       
2008 1.615*** 0.297 24.515* 
2009 1.285*** 0.17 24.938* 
2010  1.131*** 0.366 24.413* 
2011  0.887*** -0.002 25.248* 
csrD   -0.046   
arD     -0.722 
Constant 
 
 -5.464*** -3.803*** -57.468** 
 
Note: 
1. Coefficients marked as: * p<.2; ** p<.1; *** p<.005, 
2. Variables were tested for normality. Diagnostic tests were conducted on all models, and R2 were within 
appropriate ranges, and the prob>chi2=0, indicating that all models are robust. 
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Table 4: Summary of Results of Extent of Reporting Models 
  
Total 
Extent 
AR_Extent CSR_Extent 
(N = 602) (N = 453) (N = 421) 
Explanatory variables: 
Regulating influence 
SSE 1.368*** 1.099 1.056 
CASS 1.143 0.862 1.174* 
GOV 1.511*** 0.838 1.064 
Shareholding 
influence 
staownedC 0.737 0.699 0.887 
staownedL 0.795 0.723 1.059 
stashareD 1.240** 1.16 1.116 
Incentivizing 
influence 
envgraD 1.343*** 1.278*** 1.147* 
totgraD 0.852 0.758 1.03 
Interaction grantsstaown 1.259 1.531 0.971 
Control variables: 
International Influence 
oveshareD 1.982*** 1.576** 1.234 
GRI 3.100*** 1.557** 2.260*** 
griosshare  0.429*** 0.543** 0.754 
highprofile 1.173 1.336* 1.202* 
loglagtotass 1.403** 1.277* 0.953 
lagroa 1.298 1.09 1.254 
loglagtotamm 0.833 0.843 1.239 
lagroamm 0.787 0.945 0.966 
year       
2008 1.878*** 0.823 0.616* 
2009 2.100*** 0.789 0.763 
2010 2.112*** 0.935 0.772 
2011 1.998*** 0.796 0.804 
csrD   0.854   
arD     1.208*** 
Constant 40.089*** 103.152*** 135.346*** 
Note: 
1. Coefficients marked as: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01, 
2. Variables were tested for normality.   Diagnostic tests were conducted on all models, and R2 were within 
appropriate ranges, and the prob>chi2=0, indicating that all models are robust. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Disclosing Companies 
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Liberal market 
economies 
Coordinated market 
economies 
Controlled market 
economies 
National Institutions Encouraging: 
• Individualism 
• Discretionary 
agency 
• Incentivizing 
responsive actors 
• Liberalism 
• Network governance 
• Policies providing 
discretion 
• Isolated actors 
• Collectivism 
• Systemic/obligatory 
agency 
• Incentivizing program-
driven agency 
• Solidarity 
• Partnership governance 
• Policies providing 
obligations 
• Interlocking/associated 
actors 
• Controlled collectivism 
• Obligatory/ Coercive 
agency 
• Regulating/Shareholding/In
centivizing driven agency 
• Authoritarian capitalism 
• Controlling governance 
• Policies providing control 
and obligations 
• Controlled/associated actors 
 
Figure 2: Institutional CSR in Market Economies 
(adapted from Matten and Moon, 2008, p.411) 
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